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Outside the ideological connotations of ‘globalisation’, Southeast Asia has 
always been ‘global’ throughout its history. Strategically situated on the major 
maritime trade routes linking ancient Europe, India and China, Southeast 
Asia has a long dynamic history marked by shifting power and the intense 
movement of people, commodities and cultural flows. The region’s fluidity 
and cosmopolitanism is amply demonstrated by the abundance of cross-
cultural influences, shared within the region, such as technology, religious 
syncretism, language, diaspora, and even food. 
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The arrival of colonialism and the subsequent emergence of postcolonial 
nation-states in the region have significantly reconfigurated and reordered 
the patterns of human flows within the region. Border regimes have become 
prominent regulators for the movement of people and commodities across 
boundaries, such as the establishment of customs and immigration controls, 
designated for international routes and port of entries. 
On the other hand, numerous upland regions across mainland Southeast 
Asia, peripheral maritime regions such as the Sulu Sea, the Celebes Sea, and 
the internationally-partitioned island of Borneo, remain quasi-open and fluid 
spaces where people and commodities traverse international boundaries 
relatively unchecked by border controls. This indicates that states rarely reach 
that idealised omnipotence to exercise total and coherent power over space 
and societal mobility. This is especially true for postcolonial states around the 
world. State borders throughout Southeast Asia have generally been established 
in an arbitrary fashion, where ethnic, linguistic, social and economic borders 
never neatly intersected with formal state boundaries drawn on maps. As a 
result, shared ethnicity, language, identities and economic interconnectivity 
remain to transcend many state boundaries. As such, the nation-state remains 
to be an alien and contested idea in many upland borderland regions around 
Southeast Asia (see Scott, 2009; Van Schendel, 2005). However, this does 
not imply that national identities have made no inroads in these seemingly 
‘stateless’ and ‘unruly’ backyards. Even a remote but culturally fluid region 
such as central Borneo has not escaped, since the 1980s, the onslaught of 
identity differentiation between ‘Indonesians’ and ‘Malaysians’. I have 
chosen to follow a materialist approach linking the differentiation of national 
identities to the process of capitalist globalisation, based on a multi-sited 
ethnographic study focused on mobility history conducted from 2000 to 2007 
among the Kenyah, an ethnic group residing in central Borneo.
The history of Kenyah mobility from the Apokayan highlands (in today’s 
Indonesia) into Sarawak (Malaysia) provides a tragic example of how an 
ethnic group became gradually alienated from Sarawak’s social and economic 
fabric in which they were an integrated and of which significant part. My final 
examination looks at the capitalist-based structural ordering of the Sarawak 
space itself, which has been an effective substitution to any organizational 
power of the state in bringing social demarcations between ‘Indonesians’ and 
‘Malaysians’ in central Borneo.
Theoretical Setting
Traditional mobility practices and spatial orientation of the most remote 
communities throughout the world were often tied to efforts in seeking shorter 
and favourable trade routes to the nearest markets. The persistent mobility   
practices in borderland regions in defiance of today’s state boundaries are 
often rooted in ancient trade routes that may have been the most efficient 
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links between supply regions to regional markets. These very same routes 
may be as efficient as today and as it has been in the past, serving the same 
purpose under contemporary capitalist modes of development and it has been 
under maritime-trade regimes of the ancient past. During the early stages 
of mercantilist capitalism in Southeast Asia, traditional mobility practices 
such as trading expeditions were increasingly suppressed by colonial power 
exactly because it was all too compatible and responsive to the demands of 
the capitalist system itself – bypassing trade monopolies, colonial tax barriers 
and inefficient trading routes.1  Up to this point it appears that both capitalism 
and people who freely move around are not conveniently compatible to state 
projects – each having their own logic and praxis of space. 
Nation-state spaces operate on the principle of fixity and bounded 
homogeneity. It is indeed the inherent obsession of states to tie people down 
into places and to assign them coherent identities, or ‘geobodies’ (e.g. Scott 
1998; Migdal 2004; Thongchai 1994). While states are inherently constructed
to function as spatial barriers, capitalism on the other hand perpetually     
strives to annihilate spatial barriers. (e.g. Marx 1973) One major theme to the         
discussion of border regimes often revolves around two dialectical historical 
trajectories – partitionary nation-state building that calls for spatial partitions 
and sedentarization of people on one hand; and capitalist-driven globalisation 
calling for open borders to facilitate the unhindered circulation of capital and 
labour on the other hand. 2
The particular focus of Marxist geography (e.g. Lefebvre, 1974; Smith, 
1984)  has been the mechanisms through which space is appropriated – how 
it is constructed, visualized, designated, and seized, and projected back – to 
serve capital (or class) interests. In order to overcome natural barriers in the 
landscape to accelerate the extraction of resources, the re-organization of 
space is then a prerequisite. Capitalism requires its own efficient order of 
space that is relatively autonomous from the inefficiency of national space 
orders on one side; and natural barriers on the other side. The invention of 
new modes of production, technology and collaboration with states enable 
the speedy reconfiguration landscapes to accelerate the efficiency of bringing 
resources from its natural deposits to markets. Terrestrial developmentalism 
has been a major undertaking throughout the world. The invention of roads, 
logging roads, ports, dams, towns, the sedentarization of human settlements, 
transmigration schemes are all manifestations of capital drive to subject the 
landscape. With these inventions come the embedded social structures that 
are designed to conform to the maximization of capital accumulation. 
1 For example, the diaspora of Bugis merchants towards the Malacca Strait was at a certain 
stage the direct result of Dutch efforts to surpress direct trading links between Makassar 
and British merchants which undermined Dutch trading interests in the region (see 
Poelinggomang, 2002).
2  Ishikawa (2008), for example, referred to these two forces as ‘the organizational power of the 
state’ and ‘the structural power of capitalism’.
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Riverine Spaces: 
Central Borneo’s Past Social, Economic & Political Organization
State borders throughout Southeast Asia have generally been established 
in an arbitrary fashion, where ethnic, linguistic, social and economic borders 
never intersected neatly with formal state boundaries drawn on maps. As a 
result, shared ethnicity, language, identity and economic interconnectivity 
remain to transcend many state boundaries. 
The island of Borneo is not only a fitting example of these arbitrary state 
partitioning processes (being partitioned into three different nation-states), 
but it serves as an ideal site of inquiry to examine the seemingly absence of 
4
Figure. 1. Research Site: Central Borneo  
(the Apo Kayan plateau marked by the square box) 
State borders through ut Southeast Asia have generally been established in an 
arbitrary fashion, where ethnic, linguistic, social and economic borders never intersected 
neatly with for al state boundaries drawn on maps. As a result, shared ethnicity, language, 
identity and economic interconnectivity remain to transcend many state boundaries.  
The island of Borneo is not only a fitting example of these arbitrary state partitioning 
processes (being partitioned into three different nation-states), but it serves as an ideal site of 
inquiry to examine the seemingly absence of effective state border regimes and the far 
penetrating effects of the capitalist reordering of the landscape.  
The area of inquiry is focused on a continuous geographical and social space that I 
will loosely define as central Borneo, which encompasses parts of the Malaysian State of 
Sarawak and the Indonesian province of East Kalimantan (see Fig. 2.).  This region 
constitutes a transnational social-cultural continuum that is rooted in the continuing flows of 
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effective state border regimes and the far penetrating effects of the capitalist 
reordering of the landscape. 
The area of inquiry is focused on a continuous geographical and social 
space that I will loosely define as central Borneo, which encompasses parts 
of the Malaysian State of Sarawak and the Indonesian province of East 
Kalimantan (see Fig. 2.).  This region constitutes a transnational social-cultural 
continuum that is rooted in the continuing flows of people, commodities and 
ideas between river basins for at least three centuries. The colonial partitioning 
of Borneo by the 1891 Anglo-Dutch Boundary Agreement was primarily 
based on the division of river basins.3 It soon became evident that the mere 
division and control over river basins did not effectively brought the smooth 
integration of these basin societies into the sphere of colonial states consistent 
to the partition agreement. 
Social and economic transbasin relationships between present day 
Kalimantan and Sarawak, characterized by interbasin trade oriented 
westwards – hence, through Sarawak – towards the South China Sea, was 
a feature that pre-existed the arrival of colonial states in Borneo. Forest and 
animal products such as gutta percha, India rubber, rhinoceros horns, bezoar 
stones and later eaglewood were primarily catered towards Chinese market 
demands throughout Southeast Asia. Social networks surrounded these chains 
of commodity flows, which in turn determined the mobility orientation of 
many interior peoples in Central Borneo towards the South China Sea (see Ooi  
Keat Gin, 1997). This may also explain why many borderland communities         
in present day of West and East Kalimantan on the Indonesian side of the 
border, maintain closer social affinities with riverine communities in Sarawak. 
In addition, the absence of any hegemonic Sultanate on Sarawak’s coastal 
estuaria may also have been an attraction for the westward flow of trade. 
This is in total contrast with Borneo’s east coast where coastal Sultanates 
like Kutai, Bulungan and Berau heavily taxed commodities coming from the 
interior. For example, as our case study will demonstrate, the Kenyah of the 
Apokayan were particularly reluctant, if not defiant, to Dutch efforts in the 
early 20th century to reorient their trading activities eastwards away from 
Sarawak. (Elshout, 1923)
Colonial Sarawak (1841-1946) on the other hand, under its regime of three 
successive ‘White Rajahs’ (James Brooke Charles Brooke and Vyner Brooke) 
sits as an anomaly among its colonial contemporaries. Compared to British 
and Dutch colonies in the region, Sarawak was immensily poor in terms 
of mineral deposits (oil was only discovered in the 1920s) and soil fertility. 
Lacking significant export revenues, Sarawak’s bureaucracy was small and 
3  See “Convention Between Great Britain and the Netherlands Defining Boundaries in Borneo 
- Signed at London, June 20, 1891” in Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden.
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underfunded. As a result, its style of governance was largely personal and 
informal, enabling Sarawak officials to have close rapport with its indigenous 
subjects. Viewing themselves as protectors for the status quo of ‘native’ 
traditional ways of life, the Brookes resisted any attempt to bring Sarawak 
under the influence of land-hungry British plantation capitalists. They believed 
that loss of native lands to capital interests would bring turmoil to Sarawak. 
The sole solution to Sarawak’s dire economic situation was to promote the 
free trade of jungle products – which the Brookes believed would bring a 
sensible and nondestructive pace of ‘civilization’ to the native ethnic groups 
of Sarawak. The logical prerequisite to boost the free trade of jungle products 
was to keep transbasin traffic of people and commodities open.4 
Transbasin trade, interethnic social interactions and migrations have been 
a constant feature of social organization among Central Borneo’s communities 
(Rousseau, 1990; Sellato, 2001; Eghenter, 1999). Rousseau (1990: 301-302) 
suggests that Central Borneo societies can be better analysed as river basin 
societies instead of as closed village units. Rousseau’s model can be applied to 
transnational transbasin societies to analyse many Central Borneo groups that 
have extensive transbasin relations under the current international partition. 
The establishment of the international boundary had for a longtime, at 
least until 1985, failed to disrupt the close social and economic interconnections 
between the the Apo Kayan plateau with Sarawak. In fact, continuing trade 
with Sarawak was a major income for the Kenyah that enabled them to pay 
Dutch door-taxes. The dismal possibilities for integrating the Apokayan’s 
4  See Reece (1988), Ooi Keat Gin (1997)
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profits and revenues generated from neighboring Sarawak.5
Kenyah Mobility from East Kalimantan to Sarawak (1900-2007) 
4 See Reece (1988), Ooi Keat Gin (1997) 
5 Lumenta (2008: 112-132). 
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economy into the Dutch and subsequent Indonesian space has so far rendered 
the region as an economic liability, and all successive governments on the 
Dutch /Indonesian side tacitly acknowledged that the Apokayan’s economic 
survival rests largely on profits and revenues generated from neighboring 
Sarawak.5
Kenyah Mobility from East Kalimantan to Sarawak (1900-2007)
The Kenyah, an umbrella ethnic identity for several swidden agricultural 
groups who are culturally, historically and linguistically related, constitute 
the majority of the population in central Borneo, a large area encompassing 
the Indonesian province of East Kalimantan and neighboring Sarawak. 
Originating from the Baram river basin in Sarawak, the Kenyah have dispersed 
into other river basins, resulting in their current distribution in both Indonesia 
(approx. 40,000 - estimates in 2000) and Malaysia (7,000 in 2000).
The cluster of Kenyah groups occupying the Apo Kayan plateau in 
East Kalimantan, for short ‘the Apo Kayan Kenyah’, is one among numerous 
‘Dayak’ groups who have witnessed the state-partitioning of their homelands 
since the emergence of colonial states and boundaries. What places the Apo 
Kayan Kenyah in a geographically unique situation is their close proximity 
to at least five major Bornean rivers (the Baluy, Balleh/Rajang, Kayan, Baram 
and the Mahakam), and their extensive transbasin extent of social relations 
encompassing the international boundary.
Being strategically located at the headwaters of major river basins that 
flow from the Apokayan - Iran highlands in centrifugal directions to Borneo’s 
west and east coasts, the Kenyah played a central role in bringing forest 
products (and later agricultural labour) from the interior to downstream 
commercial centers. This was undertaken through a traditional mobility 
practice, principally undertaken by males, called peselai (lit. ‘to go on a long 
journey’), which was previously rooted in both headhunting trips and the 
prolonged collection of jungle produce. Peselai also evolved into massive 
trading expeditions wherein 100 to 500 males would usually participate in 
completing 3 - 6 month roundtrips to coastal areas by canoes.6 A peselai trip 
was socially significant to the education of young males, not only as a rite 
of passage where they could prove their bravery and worthiness as future 
husbands, but also where they learned about the social world at large, the 
intricate networks of rivers, ethno-history, commerce and dealing with other 
ethnic groups. 
The Apo Kayan’s centrality to the flow of jungle products flowing from 
the uplands was noted by Charles Brooke, the second ‘White Rajah’ of 
5  Lumenta (2008: 112-132).
6  See Lumenta (2008), Whittier (1973), Conley (1978).
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Sarawak. He invited several Kenyah leaders on a peselai expedition to Kuching 
in 1899 and encouraged the Apo Kayan Kenyah to migrate to Sarawak under 
his protection. In turn, the Kenyah leaders who looked at the advantage of 
trading with Sarawak in the west as opposed to the Kutai sultanate in the 
east, welcomed Charles Brooke’s invitation. The Apo Kayan’s integration into 
Sarawak was coincidently cancelled due to the arrival of Dutch explorer, Dr. 
Nieuwenhuis in early 1901, who offered direct Dutch protection for the Kenyah 
against Sarawak Iban raids, which the Kenyah leaders duly accepted.7 
Despite Dutch reservations, Kenyah peselai expeditions from the Apo 
Kayan persisted in trading with Sarawak, although intertribal hostilities, 
particularly with the Sarawak Ibans, remained a major obstacle that reached a 
peak in 1921 when major headhunting incidents occurred.8 
The 1924 Kapit Peacemaking Agreement between Sarawak, Dutch, 
Iban, Kayan and Kenyah leaders had far-reaching impact for the Apo Kayan 
Kenyah. Peace with the Sarawak Ibans not only secured the liberalisation of 
Kenyah access to Sarawak river basins and coastal markets, but also enabled 
the Kenyah to enter sharecropping agreements with Sarawak Ibans, and the 
labour markets in Sarawak’s coastal logging and oil industries.
The period from 1924 to 1985, with brief disruptions during the Japanese 
occupation (1941-1945) and the Konfrontasi (1963-1966) marked the ‘golden 
years’ of peselai expeditions from the Apo Kayan into Sarawak. The Kenyah 
not only established themselves in the aforementioned important economic 
niches, but also managed to extert important cultural influences over other 
indigenous ethnic groups throughout upriver Sarawak. Peselai groups from 
the Apo Kayan brought not only influence over the arts (to a point where they 
were even invited to decorate the walls of the Sarawak Museum in Kuching 
in 1959-60), but also influence over religion.9 The Bungan faith, a reformed 
version of the original Kenyah belief system invented in the Apo Kayan, 
quickly spread and won massive converts in Sarawak from 1947 to 1955. 
This was soon followed by Christianity, which Christian Kenyah from the 
Apo Kayan brought over to Sarawak during the same period. They were also 
responsible for the translation of the first Kenyah-language Bible, sponsored 
by the Borneo Evangelical Mission, widely used in Sarawak until today.10 As 
agricultural and logging labourers, the Apokayan Kenyah enjoyed equal status 
as Sarawakians, particularly during the British period where they were paid 
equal wages as Sarawakians, received health benefits, and legal protection as 
workers. It was easy for those coming to Sarawak without border passes to 
secure work permits from British residents.
7 See Beccari (1904), Sarawak Gazette (March 1, 1901), Smythies (1955)          
8  SG (October 1, 1924)
9  See Langub (1997) for example.
10  See Prattis (1963) and Sidang Injil Borneo (1988)
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During the mid-1970s peselai teams began to experience the effects 
of the increasing criminalization of ‘illegal’ entry through tightening of 
immigration controls, marked by the increase of police checks at major 
logging towns, such as Sibu, Bintulu and Miri. It was during the early 1980s 
when local Sarawakians, mainly Ibans, Kayans and local Kenyah, started to 
gradually pull out from hazardous positions in logging jobs (i.e. chainsaw 
operators), which further compounded labour shortages in Sarawak’s 
logging industry.11 Improved education among Sarawakians also resulted 
in their upward mobility in occupying middle to higher level positions in the 
logging camp hierarchies. This left an increasing vacuum in the lower rank 
positions, which were most of the part plugged by the increasing numbers of 
Apokayan Kenyah workers from Indonesia.  
Nationwide Malaysian police raids on illegal migrants, starting with Nyah 
(‘Get Rid’) Operations in the mid-1980s, restricted Kenyah labour migrations 
from heavily patrolled urban areas. Nonetheless, many Indonesian Kenyahs 
could pass off as local Sarawakians and police officers were usually unable 
to distinguish them from the local Sarawak Kenyah populace. Some even cut 
their hair in traditional Kenyah fashion to blend in.12 In addition, significant 
proportions of the local Sarawak populace did not possess Identity Cards 
themselves. The ongoing citizen registration process in upriver areas was an 
opportunity for Indonesian Kenyah migrants to naturalize themselves with the 
help of local Kenyah hosts acting as guarantors. A local Kayan politician with 
links to Kenyah leaders in the Apokayan, Tajang Laing, accordingly provided 
200 Indonesian Bakung Kenyah plantation workers at Sepakau with Sarawak 
Identity cards around 1985.13 Following nationwide crackdowns on illegal 
immigrants, the role of Sarawak Kenyahs and politicians who had personal 
or kinship relations with peselai team members became more prominent in 
providing protective measures against police checks. This, however, placed 
many Apokayan Kenyah in asymmetrical power relations with their Sarawak 
kin through debt-bondage, servitude, the rise of patronage, and the creation 
of an Indonesian Kenyah ‘underclass’ in general.
Two developments have come to alter significantly the social-economic 
relationship between the Apokayan Kenyah and Sarawak. First, the successive 
timber booms in Sarawak, which peaked in the 1970s and onwards, has 
marginalized the longstanding trade of jungle products into and from Sarawak. 
Losing one of their primary economic niches, the Apokayan Kenyah’s role in 
the Sarawak economy was relegated to supplying the pool of labour under 
11 Inadequate insurance and compensation rendered logging jobs more and more unattractive            
in the face of better jobs that Sarawakians could find in urban areas.
12 The traditional Kenyah hairstyle is marked by a long pigtail in the back. This has gone out of                  
fashion in Kalimantan since the 1960s, but preserved among the Sarawak Kenyah until quite 
recently. 
13 Interview with Dato’ Tajang Laing, Kuching, March 2003.       
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the vast hierarchy of the timber industries. In addition to being relegated to 
the lower strata of the production hierarchy, the increased formalization of the 
Malaysian – Indonesian border in the 1980s placed them within the category 
of ‘illegal migrants’ without access to insurance and labour rights. It is no 
longer safe for Apokayan Kenyah to enter towns in Sarawak to cash in their 
wages at local banks without the risks of being apprehended by the increasing 
police checks in downriver regions. They often have to rely on camp canteen 
managers to cash it for them, subject to a 5% commission.
Hitching on logging pickup cars is not always a convenient undertaking. 
Sarawak Iban drivers, higher in the ranks within the camp hierarchy, often 
refuse to take the Apokayan Kenyah workers on their rides unless they pay 
a hefty fee of RM 50 (although camp regulations explicitly forbid any form of 
payments or bribes made for the utilizing of logging vehicles). 
Their insecure status as illegal migrants has also affected the changing 
preferences of cross-border marriages even among the Kenyah. It was common 
up to the early 1980s for Apokayan males to marry Sarawakian females.  By 
the 1990s cross-border marriage rates in central Borneo have gone down. 
Even in the small numbers of recent marriages, the trends have reversed to 
Sarawakian males marrying Indonesian females.14 
Recent younger generations from the Apokayan arrive in Sarawak with 
scant knowledge of the geography, such as village locations, rivers. Being 
confined to the logging camps, they have little contact with the outside world. 
Although the extensive logging roads have made travelling around Sarawak, 
especially to logging towns much easier, they no longer meander through the 
riverine clusters of Kenyah and Kayan villages that used to function as transit 
sites, social safety nets or sites for socializing in the past. The cosmopolitanism 
of previous Kenyah generations, who could freely move around, interact, 
socialize, negotiate, absorb and transmit cultural ideas, has been lost among 
the younger ones. Peselai journeys of today are reduced to labour migrations 
to logging camps.
From Riverine to Terrestrial Space Ordering: the New ‘Borders’
The history of Kenyah mobility into Sarawak demonstrates the changing 
nature of space ordering. Since the arrival of colonial states and the resulting 
of impact, it has cross-border social relations and the emergence of state border 
regimes. The early Sarawak state under the Brookes chose to adjust itself
14 For example, in the village of Long Mekaba, a Kenyah settlement in the Baram, there was a 
time around 1978 when six Indonesian Kenyah males managed to legally marry with females 
from the local populace. Only one cross-border marriage occurred in 2000 when a Sarawak 
Kenyah male married an Indonesian Kenyah female, but given the lack of the bride’s birth 
certificate or passport, the Sarawak authorities refused to legalize the marriage. (Interview 
with Ingkong Lahang & William Ukeng, Long Mekaba, January 2003.)
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within the indigenous riverine-based social order. It did so by facilitating the 
improvement social relations between riverine communities that extended 
from Sarawak’s west coast up to the Apokayan in Dutch Borneo. Pacification 
of the interior and the liberalisation of human traffic through open borders 
and rivers were viewed as essential for the Sarawak economy. By basing itself 
on this riverine-based governance over space, the Brookes considered the 
Apokayan as an integral social and economic space of Sarawak. This entailed 
that Sarawak under the Brookes had little interest in upholding the Anglo-
Dutch international boundary. This longstanding riverine space order existed 
well into the transitionary period under British rule (1946-1963). The Kenyah 
of the Apokayan were not viewed as ‘Indonesians’ or ‘aliens’. 
Conditions started to change with the resurgence of Sarawak’s logging 
industry which spread inwards to the interior after Konfrontasi ended in 
the late 1960s. The logging industry, Sarawak’s major revenue earner, is 
basically a terrestrial enterprise that partitioned lands into neatly bounded 
concession areas. The accessibility to timber requires the introduction of new 
transportation modes and infrastructures such as trucks, pick ups and land 
roads. The extensive network of logging roads not only changed the physical 
landscape throughout Sarawak, but it has also increasingly shifted social 
organization away from the quasi-egalitarian order of riverine relationships to 
the highly hierarchized world of logging camps. The social order in Sarawak 
has gradually shifted from riverine to terrestrial based relations. 
It is within this hierarchy world of logging camps where the national 
borders are created and reproduced. Far from being a territorial border, 
the border separating Indonesians from Malaysians in the central Borneo 
context is manifested through asymmetrical power relations in everyday life 
experiences: wage differences, the dependency on Malaysian Iban drivers, the 
small prospective of finding a Sarawakian spouse, illegal deductions from 
salaries, and the narrowing access to a wider social world outside logging 
camps in general. 
Embedded in the history of Kenyah mobility is the shifting context from 
Sarawak as an open and fluid riverine-based on social space under colonial 
rule to a closed and stratified social space ordered by capital logic. It is hoped 
that the presented case study reverses some assumptions on the linearity of 
postwar ‘globalisation’ and its saturated jargonism about the creation of a 
‘borderless world’ by providing contrary evidence that latter-day globalisation 
in the form of capitalist development has increasingly created new border 
regimes that increasingly equates national identities with differentiations of 
class.
With the blurring between nation-state and corporate interests, the 
most effective border regime to support the maximization of profits and 
minimization of (labour) costs would be a model that operates on hierarchical 
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rather than territorial / spatial containment. The two historical trajectories, 
that of the nation state and capitalism, have found a working equilibrium 
marked by the containment of people, not through spatial partitions and 
borders, but through their containment within fixed hierarchies of capitalist 
production. l
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